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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to extend the bilateral contracting problem studied in Townsend (1979)
and Gale and Hellwig (1985) to an explicit, multilateral contracting arrangement which resembles
banking. We derive the structure of an optimal contract for a large but finite intermediary, establish
gains from delegated monitoring, and study the incentive problem of the monitor in an economy where
the intermediary has no information, risk, or cost advantage relative to individual agents. Unlike
previous delegated monitoring studies, the law of large numbers is not sufficient to obtain our results.
Instead, we appeal to a stronger result, the large deviation principle, which establishes that convergence
in the law of large numbers is exponential.

1 Introduction
The literatures on both contract theory and on the nature of financial inter-
mediaries have grown extensively in recent years. However, much of the first
literature has restricted attention to bilateral agreements between represen-
tative agents. For example, Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985)
consider single representative investor-entrepreneur pairings in markets with
information asymmetries where agents must trade to facilitate production.
This restriction to bilateral representative agent contracts is appropriate in
the Townsend and Gale and Hellwig studies since the central research ques-
tion addressed is the allocative effect of information problems in competitive
economies. In contrast, recent contributions to the financial intermediation
literature have extended bilateral contract models to multilateral settings
to generate intermediary-like institutions endogenously. For example, Dia-
mond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986) explain the existence of financial
intermediaries as cost-minimizing institutional responses to the need for in-
formation production. Boyd and Prescott use the theory of mechanism design
to endogenously motivate intermediation, while Diamond establishes that it
may be optimal for investors to delegate monitoring tasks to an intermediary.
In this paper we study the delegated monitoring problem posed by Dia-
mond in a multilateral version of the Gale and Hellwig model. We consider
an economy with a large number of investors and entrepreneurs who must
trade to facilitate production. Entrepreneurs have private information about
their output, but a costly technology exists which can be used to verify re-
turns ex-post. Agents have the option to either contract directly or to elect
an intermediary to represent their interests. In the first case, each investor
must monitor each project that he/she has an interest in independently. This
is the one-sided contract problem studied by Gale and Hellwig. In the second
case, investors elect a representative to whom they delegate the monitoring
task (the "intermediary" or "delegated monitor"). This intermediary con-
tracts with all remaining investors and each entrepreneur, and is charged with
the responsibility of monitoring the entrepreneurs. This two-sided contract
problem is the main focus of our paper.
The crucial question which arises in a delegated monitoring setting is
—
who monitors the monitor? Two previous mechanisms have been proposed
to ensure that the intermediary truthfully reports actual payoffs to the in-
vestors. First, Diamond (1984, p. 369) assumes that the intermediary is
subject to unbounded, non-pecuniary penalties such as lost time and reputa-
tion, or less plausibly, physical punishment. Unfortunately, the unbounded
and imprecise nature of this enforcement mechanism is difficult to rationalize
on economic grounds. Further, as Gale and Hellwig (1985, p. 649) note: The
imposition of these penalties is "equivalent to perfect bond-posting," and con-
sequently the incentive problem "becomes innocuous." Second, Williamson
(1986, p. 169) assumes that the intermediary's actual monitoring costs are
fixed and independent of its size. This assumption implies that the inter-
mediary's marginal monitoring costs decrease as the size of the intermediary
increases. Unfortunately, this specification confers on the intermediary an in-
herent cost advantage (i.e., a natural monitoring monopoly), and hence the
dominance of delegated monitoring over direct investment is not surprising. 1
We study an alternative incentive mechanism, costly state verification
of both the entrepreneurs and the intermediary, in an economy where the
intermediary has no information, risk, or cost advantage vis-a-vis investors.
We show that under this mechanism, delegated monitoring strictly domi-
nates direct investment and simple debt is an optimal contract for all agents.
Previous delegated monitoring studies have established gains from intermedi-
ation by appealing to the law of large numbers. 2 However, in our symmetric
lOf course Williamson's main concern was credit rationing.
2 Diamond shows that the penalties per entrepreneur go to zero as the number of entre-
preneurs (/) becomes large. Williamson shows that the expected cost of monitoring the
monitor goes to zero as / becomes large, when the costs are independent of I
.
cost setting an investor's cost of monitoring the monitor is increasing in the
number of entrepreneurs, and hence becomes infinite as the number of entre-
preneurs goes to infinity. Clearly, the law of large numbers is not sufficient
to establish gains from monitoring in this context. Instead, we use the large
deviation principle, a stronger result, which shows that convergence in the
law of large numbers is exponential. This alternative mathematical approach
is essential in the economy that we consider.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the
model. The main result from Section 3 establishes that there are gains from
intermediation. In Section 4 we show that if there are sufficiently many en-
trepreneurs, two-sided simple debt is an optimal contract. Section 5 contains
essential mathematical results, and Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with finite numbers of two types of risk neutral agents,
investors and entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur i = 1, . .
.
, I is endowed with
a risky investment project which transforms y units of a single input at time
into Oi units of ouput at time 1, but has no endowment of the input. In
contrast, each investor j = 1, . .
.
, J is endowed with 1 unit of the homoge-
neous input, but has no direct access to a productive technology. We assume
that y is an integer with y > 1. Hence, the project of an entrepreneur cannot
be financed by a single investor. 3 The total available supply of investment
is larger than the input required by all entrepreneurs, so J investors can be
accomodated by the / entrepreneurs (i.e., J = yl). All entrepreneurs and
investors are symmetrically informed about the distribution of
t
at time 0,
but asymmetric information exists about the state of the project's actual re-
3This assumption implies that there is duplicative monitoring in the absence of inter-
mediation, because more than one investor must monitor a single entrepreneur. Delegated
monitoring economizes on these costs (c.f, Diamond (1984)).
alization ex-post. In particular, only entrepreneur i freely observes the actual
realization of 0, at time 1, where this actual realization is denoted by w.
As in Townsend (1979) suppose that a technology exists which can be
used to verify w to non-owners at time 1. Let this verification technology
have the following characteristics:
(Tl) Use of the state verification technology is costly; and
(T2) w is privately revealed only to the individual who requests (deterministic)
costly state verification (CSV). 4
Assumption (Tl) is similar with the specification of the CSV technology
in Townsend, except that as in Gale and Hellwig (1985, p. 651) the veri-
fication cost is comprised of both a pecuniary component and an indirect
"pecuniary equivalent" of a non-pecuniary cost. The non-pecuniary costs
permit negative utility but rule out negative consumption, while pecuniary
equivalents of non-pecuniary costs ensure that the costs can be shared by
the contracting parties. 5 In contrast, assumption (T2) differs fundamentally
from the specification in Townsend. In his model w is publicly announced
after CSV occurs, while in our model w is privately revealed only to the agent
who requests CSV. Assumption (T2) is essential for our analysis since if all
information could be made public ex-post, there would be no need to monitor
the monitor. However, it also appears to accurately describe the privacy and
institutional features which characterize most lending arrangements.6
The following assumptions summarize technical aspects of the economy.
(Al) The 6{ are independent, identically distributed random variables on the
probability space (fi,«4, P). 7
4Stochastic verification is discussed in the concluding section.
5These costs may be thought of as the money paid to an attorney to file a claim (a
pecuniary cost) and the monetary value of time lost when visiting the attorney (a pecuniary
equivalent). Note that Diamond's costs were unbounded while these costs are fixed.
6 Diamond (1984, p. 395) observes: "Financial intermediaries in the world monitor
much information about their borrowers in enforcing loan covenents, but typically do not
directly announce this information or serve an auditor's function."
7We will always refer to this probability space without mentioning it explicitly, when
(A2) The distribution F has a continuously differentiable density / with re-
spect to the Lebesgue measure, and f(x) > for every x £ [0,T].
(A3) The ex-post verification cost is a fixed constant.
Because entrepreneurs have technologies but no input and investors have
input but no technologies, it is clear that agents will wish to trade in this econ-
omy to facilitate production. The remainder of this section will be devoted to
specifying contracts which govern trade among agents and the optimization
problems from' which these contracts can be derived. Formal proofs that the
contracts are indeed optimal are deferred to Sections 3 and 4.
2.1 The Direct Investment Problem
Let all direct, bilateral interactions between investors and entrepreneurs be
regulated by a contract whose general form is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A one-sided contract between an investor and an entrepreneur
is a pair (/?(•), 5), where R(-) is an integrable, positive payment function on
IR+ , such that R(w) < w for every w E IR+ and S is an open subset of M+
which determines the state where monitoring occurs.
As is standard practice in this literature, we restrict the universe of con-
tracts that we consider to the set of incentive compatible contracts. Let
C = (R(.),S) denote this set. The following condition ensures that all con-
tracts under consideration satisfy this restriction. There exists R £ IR+
such that S = {w: R(w) < R). It is well known that the imposition of this
restriction is without loss of generality because any arbitrary contract can
be replaced by an incentive compatible contract with the same actual payoff
(c.f., Townsend (1979, p. 270)). Therefore, the set of all incentive compatible
contracts is fully specified by the tuple (R(-),R).
writing P for probability or E for expected value.
We will study a particular type of contract, called a simple debt contract
(SDC), which we describe in Definition 2. The fact that simple debt is the
optimal contract among all one-sided investment schemes is a well known
result which we state formally in Theorem 1.
Definition 2. (R(-),R) is a simple debt contract if: R(w) = w for w G S =
{w < R} and R(w) = R if w G Sc = {w > R}.
The payment schedules in Definition 2 resemble simple debt because:
(i) When verification does not occur the payment to the investor is constant
(i.e., the entrepreneur pays a fixed amount R for all realizations of the
state above some cutoff level), where Sc is the complement of S.
(ii) When verification does occur the payment to the investor is state con-
tingent (i.e., the entrepreneur pays the entire realization for all outcomes
below the cutoff), where S is viewed as the set of bankruptcy states.
We will often denote SDCs by R. These contracts have been studied
extensively by Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and others. It is
well known that SDCs arise as optimal (cost-minimizing) responses to asym-
metric information problems in economies with costly deterministic state
verification technologies. In essence, agents minimize verification costs in
such economies by verifying only low realizations of #, and accepting fixed
payments (which do not require monitoring) in all other states.
The investor and the entrepreneur's direct investment problem can now
be stated formally:
f
T
max / \w — R(w)\ dF(w)
(R(),S)ecJo
subject to
-f R{w)dF{w)- I cdF{w)>r. (1)J Jo Js
This "one-sided problem' 1 describes the nature of trade when investors
and entrepreneurs contract directly: The expected utility of a representative
entrepreneur is maximized, subject to a constraint that the expected return
of a representative investor, net of monitoring costs (c), be at least as great as
some reservation level (r). Note that R(-) is the total payment to all investors,
and IJJ is the number of investors required to fund a single project. The
problem reflects the assumption that credit markets are competitive.8
2.2 The Delegated Monitoring Problem
We will now construct an alternative, multilateral contract problem that
we will refer to as the intermediary's "two-sided problem." The essential
difference between the two problems is as follows. When investors and en-
trepreneurs write direct bilateral contracts, each investor must monitor each
entrepreneur with whom he/she contracts in certain states of nature, so du-
plicative monitoring is inherent in this setting. In contrast, if investors elect
a monitor to perform the verification task, it may be possible to eliminate
some of the duplicative monitoring (even though investors must monitor the
monitor in some states of nature).
Consider now the delegated monitoring problem (i.e., the election of an
intermediary). The lending market is competitive, hence it follows that an
investor who wishes to act as an intermediary must offer contracts which
maximize the expected utility of the entrepreneurs and assure each investor
of at least the reservation level of utility. Otherwise, agents would trade di-
rectly or another intermediary would offer an alternative contract (i.e., there
is free entry into intermediation) with terms that are preferable to the / entre-
preneurs and/or the remaining J — 1 investors. Let (R(-),S) denote aspects
of the two-sided contract which pertain to the entrepreneur-intermediary re-
lationship and (R*(-), S*) denote aspects of the two-sided contract which
8We consider an economy in which there are more agents who wish to invest than
investment opportunities. Since the supply of loans is inelastic, the level of return necessary
to attract investors is driven down to the reservation level r.
pertain to the intermediary-investor relationship. 9 Thus, the intermediary's
problem embodies optimization by all agents in the economy.
Before stating the intermediary's problem, we must first derive the ran-
dom variables which describe the income from its portfolio. Recall that
R(w) denotes the payoff by an entrepreneur to the intermediary if output w
is realized and #,- is the random variable which describes the output w of a
particular entrepreneur i in state u. Consequently, the intermediary's income
from this entrepreneur, given transfer R(-), is Gi(R(');u) = R(6i(u)). The
random variables G{ are independent for each choice of R(-) because the #,-
are independent. Assume that the intermediary contracts with i = 1,2,...,/
entrepreneurs. Thus, the average income of the intermediary per entrepre-
neur under payment schedule R(-), denoted by G i(R(-);uj), is:
G'{R(-);») =WGi (R(-); U ). (2)
Finally, let F J (-) be the distribution function of G ! (-).
The purpose of this paper is to establish gains from delegated monitor-
ing in an economy where the intermediary has no information, risk, or cost
advantage vis-a-vis investors. Since we do not distinguish the intermediary
a priori, it has no information advantage. Further, since investors are risk
neutral it has no risk advantage. The investors' cost structure for monitor-
ing the monitor remains to be specified. Let c denote the actual fixed cost
incurred by the intermediary when it monitors entrepreneur i, and c\ denote
the actual cost incurred by an investor when he/she monitors the interme-
diary with portfolio of size /. The expected monitoring costs are of primary
importance to the intermediary and the investors when they make their deci-
sions at time (i.e., Js cdF(-) and Js . c^dF
1
^) respectively). These expected
9 Recall that (R(.),S) is also used to denote the entrepreneur-investor contract in the
one-sided model. We avoid introducing additional notation at this point because the
incentive problem associated with ensuring that entrepreneurs report truthfully is the
same regardless of whether they report to the investors directly or to the intermediary.
costs depend on three factors: the actual costs (c and c}), the relevant states
(S and 5*), and the size of the intermediary (via c} and F! (-)).
It is clearly not reasonable to assume that the intermediary's actual moni-
toring costs are independent of its size. Although cost and other asymmetries
may exist in actual economies (providing other reasons for the existence of
intermediaries), we wish to evaluate the efficacy of delegated monitoring as
an independent rationale for intermediation. Hence we make the following
cost symmetry assumption:
(CS) The costs of monitoring the monitor c*j are linearly increasing in its size. 10
Assumption CS is fulfilled, for example, when state verification by in-
vestors involves verifying the full state (i.e., each of the / projects in the
intermediary's portfolio). Our goal in this paper is to establish gains from
monitoring which stem solely from the intermediary's ability to eliminate
duplicative (but symmetric) monitoring costs. If investors can economize
further on these costs (e.g., by monitoring only insolvent firms or monitor-
ing stochastically), then delegated monitoring will be even more attractive.
Thus, we view this example as a benchmark case. 11
The two-sided contract between the intermediary and each entrepreneur,
and the intermediary and the investors, can now be defined.
Definition 3. A two-sided contract is a four-tuple ((/?(•), 5), (/?*(•), 5*))
having the following properties:
(i) R(-) is an integrable positive payment function from an entrepreneur to
the intermediary such that R(w) < w for every w 6 IR+, and S is an
10
If the intermediary's actual cost is bounded from above its marginal cost of contracting
with additional firms is decreasing in 7 at a rate faster than 1/7, giving it an inherent cost
advantage relative to individual investors.
11 Many symmetric cost structures satisfy assumption CS, hence it is not restrictive. We
discuss this example because if we can establish gains from intermediation for a benchmark
case (i.e., when the institutional structure is such that intermediary failures are quite
costly) then clearly our arguments will hold for less costly cases. Exponentially increasing
costs are also permissible, as long as they do not increase faster than the bound given by
equation (21). However, we regard such exponentially increasing costs as implausible.
10
open subset of M+ which determines the set of all realizations of an
entrepreneur's project where the intermediary must monitor;
(ii) R*{-) is an integrable positive payment function from the intermediary to
the investors such that R*(w) < w. For every realization w of G 7 (-), 12
the payment to an individual investor is given by j^R*(w); 13 and S* is
an open subset of 1R+ which determines the set of all realizations of the
intermediary's income from the entrepreneurs the investors must monitor.
We now derive the set of all incentive compatible two-sided contracts.
As in the one-sided problem, we again restrict our analysis to this set with-
out loss of generality. Clearly each entrepreneur will again announce an
output which minimizes its payment obligations to the intermediary. Let
w = argminx65 R(x) be the output that minimizes this payoff over all non-
monitoring states, and recall that w is observed directly in the monitoring
states S. Consequently, the announcement by an entrepreneur is given by
arg min^y, ^ R(x). A similar condition holds for the intermediary-investor
portion of the contract (i.e., /?*(•), R*). As in the one-sided problem, the fol-
lowing condition ensures that all contracts are incentive compatible. There
exist R, R* e B+ such that S = {w: R(w) < R] and 5* = {w: R*{w) < R*}.
The set of all incentive compatible two-sided contracts is fully specified by
the four-tuple (#(•), R), (#*(•), R*).
Finally, a two-sided simple debt contract can now be defined:
Definition 4. A contract (R(-),R), (Rm (-),R*) is a two-sided simple debt
contract (denoted by (R,R*)) if:
(i) R(w) = w lor w £ S = {w < R} and R(w) = R if w G S c = {w > R}-
and
12 Recall that G () is the average income per entrepreneur defined by equation (2).
13
It is convenient to define R"{-) as the total payment by the intermediary to investors
per entrepreneur. Therefore, in order to derive the payment to an individual investor we
must multiply this amount with jtt-
11
(ii) RT(w) = w for w e S' = {w < R*} and R*(w) = R* if w € S* c = {w >
R*}.
We will often denote two-sided simple debt contracts by (R,R*).
The intermediary's two-sided optimization problem can now be stated:
•T
subject to
max / [w — R(w)]dF(w)
,R),(R'(-),R*)Jo
J
^— l
T
R'(w) dF'W-), R)(w) - f c) dF\R(-), R)(w) > r (3)
— Wo Js*
[
T
[w - R'{w)} dF'iRi-), R)(w) - I cdF(w)
Jo Js
> r. (4)
This problem states that the intermediary maximizes the expected utility
of each ex-ante identical entrepreneur subject to two constraints. (3) states
that the expected payoff to the J — 1 remaining investors (i.e., those who
did not become intermediaries) must be at least r, the reservation level of
utility. (4) states that the profit from intermediation (i.e., net payoffs from
the entrepreneurs less the payoff to the investors) must also be at least r.
3 Delegated Monitoring
In this section we obtain two main results. First, Theorem 1 establishes that
simple debt is the optimal contract among all one-sided investment schemes.
This is the Gale and Hellwig (1985) result for our economy. Second, The-
orem 2 establishes that two-sided simple debt with delegated monitoring
dominates one-sided direct investment if there are sufficiently many entre-
preneurs. The proof relies on the large deviation principle. This principle,
and its relation to the law of large numbers, is also discussed. We prove the
optimality of two-sided simple debt contracts in Section 4. Throughout these
sections we appeal to certain mathematical results proved in Section 5.
12
Theorem 1. Simple Debt is the optimal contract among all one-sided in-
vestment schemes.
Theorem 1 is proved in Gale and Hellwig (1985) as Proposition 4. A
similar result is also proved in Williamson (1986). The strategy of the proof
is as follows. Consider two optimal contracts: Let R be a simple debt contract
and {A('), A) be some alternative contract. Since both contracts are optimal,
both must yield the same expected payoff to entrepreneurs. With the first
contract investors request verification if w < R. In the alternative contract,
verification occurs in all states w such that w < A. Since A > R (otherwise
the contracts cannot have the same return to entrepreneurs) the expected
verification costs must be less for the simple debt contract R.
Theorem 2. Two-sided simple debt contracts with delegated monitoring
strictly dominate one-sided direct investment if there are sufficiently many
entrepreneurs.
Proof. Our arguments depend on the continuity of the constraints, estab-
lished by Lemma 1 in Section 5, and can be summarized as follows. Let R
be the simple debt contract which is optimal among all one-sided schemes
described by Theorem 1. We show that there exists an R* such that (3) is
binding for the two-sided contract (R,R*), and that by increasing R* the
payoff to investors increases and (3) does not bind. 14 We next show that (4)
is fulfilled but not binding. Hence increasing R* slightly makes both con-
straints slack if the number of entrepreneurs is sufficiently large. This proves
the Theorem since by lowering R we can make the entrepreneurs better off
than in the one-sided scheme.
We begin by showing that the costs of monitoring the monitor go to zero
if R* is less than the intermediary's expected return from one entrepreneur,
14 In general, the investors' payoff does not increase monotonically with R* because the
probability that investors must monitor the intermediary is an increasing function of R"
.
This is also true for one-sided schemes (c.f., Gale and Hellwig (1985, p. 662)).
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R" < E[Gi(R{-))], and if the intermediary is sufficently large. This means:
lim f c'jdF
J (w) = for every R* < E[G t (R(-))]. (5)
I—oo J
(5) follows immediately from (21) of Lemma 4 in Section 5, which establishes
that the probability of a default by the delegated monitor (i.e., the probability
that an investor must monitor the monitor), converges to zero exponentially.
However, by assumption (CS) the monitoring costs d] increase only linearly.
The key insight of the proof is that, in expected terms, the costs go to zero.
The Theorem is proved as follows:
(i) The law of large numbers implies that
lim f R'(w)dF I {R{-)){w) = R' for every R' < E[G t (R{-))]. (6)/— CO J
(6) indicates that the probability of a default by the delegated monitor
goes to zero. Hence investors get the face value of the SDC with certainty.
(ii) (5) and (6) imply that we can find a two-sided contract (R,A m ) such
that (3) is fulfilled for sufficiently large / but not binding. Because of
the continuity of (3) with respect to R and A" (Lemma 1), there must
exist a face value R" < A" such that (3) is binding for the two-sided
contract (R,R m ). By construction, increasing R" slightly implies that the
investors' payoff increases.
(iii) All that remains to show is that (4) is also fulfilled, but not binding.
Because of (5), it follows that fs cdF > fs . c) dF 1 for all sufficiently large
/. This and the fact that (3) is binding implies
if R'(w)dF l <{J -l)(r+ / cdF). (7)
Consequently,
J [w- R'iw^dF
1
- I cdF
> IE[Gi(R)] -J I cdF -(J - l)r > Jr - (J-- l)r
14
/
where the first inequality follows from (7) and the second inequality fol-
lows from the fact that R must fulfill constraint (1) of the one-sided
problem by assumption. This proves Theorem 2.
In the proof of Theorem 2 we use the large deviation principle. This
principle is related to the law of large numbers but is stronger. In particular,
the large deviation principle shows that convergence in the law of large num-
bers is exponential. The principle is essential in establishing equation (5) in
the proof, and is referenced formally in the proof of Lemma 4 in Section 5.
The economic intuition behind the problem addressed by Theorem 2 is that
monitoring costs are linearly increasing in the number of entrepreneurs (i.e.,
as the size of the intermediary gets large, the verification costs, c*r , in the
the bankruptcy state become large as well). However, if the probability of
default goes to zero "fast enough," then the expected value of the costs of
monitoring the monitor become insignificant for a well diversified intermedi-
ary - even though the intermediary is of finite size and hence is not perfectly
diversified. The role of the large deviation principle is to provide a conver-
gence result that is "fast enough" (i.e., faster than that provided by the law
of large numbers) to generate gains from intermediation.
Theorem 2 establishes that two-sided arrangements are better than one-
sided direct investment. However, the following problem remains: If (3)
and (4) are not binding it is not clear who gets the surplus. Thus, the
maximization problem is not well defined. The following proposition shows
that this difficulty does not arise and that optimal contracts exist.
Proposition 1. // there are sufficiently many entrepreneurs, then there
exist optimal contracts among the set of all two-sided simple debt contracts.
The two constraints from the intermediary's optimization problem bind for
all optimal contracts.
Proof. The result follows directly from the continuity results of Lemma 1 in
15
Section 5. The existence of optimal contracts is straightforward since accord-
ing to Lemma 1 both the constraints and the argument we are maximizing
over are continuous functions of R and R*. To show that both constraints
must bind for optimal contracts, consider the following cases,
(i) Suppose by way of contradiction that at an optimum both constraints
do not bind. Then R can be reduced slightly without violating the con-
straints. This, however, contradicts the optimality of the contract, so it
is not possible that both constraints are slack at an optimum,
(ii) Suppose that only (3) does not bind. Then R* can be reduced slightly
without violating the constraint. This reduces the total payment of the
intermediary to the investors, but (4) will no longer bind and we can
apply the above argument to get a contradiction,
(iii) Finally, suppose that only (4) does not bind. We must show that (3) no
longer binds if R* is increased by a small amount. This is not straightfor-
ward since by increasing R* we automatically increase the expected cost
of monitoring the monitor. However, (6) establishes that this expected
monitoring cost goes to zero as the size of the intermediary increases.
Further, it follows from (4) that R" remains bounded away from EG l (R)
as / increases. 15 Thus, the expected cost of monitoring the monitor re-
mains close to zero (i.e., changes very little) if we increase R* slightly.
Consequently, if only (4) does not bind the gain from a higher payment
to investors exceeds the loss from an increase in monitoring expenditures
and (3) does not bind, a contradiction. Hence, both constraints must
bind at an optimum.
4 Optimality of Two-Sided Simple Debt
The proof that two-sided simple debt is optimal requires a slightly stronger
result than that used in the previous section. In particular, in the Proof of
15 Divide both sides of (4) by / and take the limit for / — oo.
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Theorem 2 we used Lemma 4 from Section 5 to establish that the proba-
bilities of default converged exponentially to zero. We now use Lemma 5
from Section 5, to show that the densities also converge exponentially to
zero. From this result we get the following Corollary which establishes that
the difference in probability between the realization being below x\ and x 2 ,
respectively, is bounded by the absolute value of the difference between Xi
and X2 times a term which converges exponentially to zero.
Corollary 1. Let R > and z < EGi(R). Then there exist a > and I >
such that |P(G7 (£) < x x ) - P{G r(R) < x 2 )\ < e~ aI \x 1 - x 2 \ for every x x ,
x 2 < z, for every I > I , and for every R > R.
This Corollary is essential for establishing the main Theorem of this Sec-
tion. The main problem of the proof is that two-sided simple debt contracts
do not necessarily minimize the expected costs of monitoring the monitor, as
the following example shows:
Example 1. In order to simplify the computations, we consider a discrete
distribution. Using simple approximation arguments it is easy to extend the
example to the case of continuous distributions. Assume that there are two
entrepreneurs i = 1,2, and that the realization of t is with probability 0.4;
and 1 and 2 each with probability 0.3. Let (P, R*) be a simple debt contract
with R = 1 and R* = 0.7; 16 and (A(-),R*) be an alternative contract such
that A(0) = A(l) = and A(2) = 2. The investor-intermediary part of
the contract is the same in both cases, and both contracts yield the same
expected return to the entrepreneurs. However, the probability of a default
by the intermediary is lower with the second contract. Specifically, it is 0.49
for the alternative contract and 0.64 for the simple debt contract.
As we have seen in Theorem 1, simple debt contracts are optimal for
the one-sided problem. Any other contracts generate higher expected costs
16 Recall that Ft* is the total payment by the intermediary to the investors per firm.
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for monitoring the entrepreneurs. In the two-sided case we essentially must
minimize the sum of the expected costs of monitoring the entrepreneurs and
of monitoring the intermediary. Unfortunately, the second summand need
not be minimal for two-sided simple debt as Example 1 shows. The main idea
of the proof of the following Theorem is to show that the one-sided and two-
sided problems are essentially the same for large intermediaries (i.e., changes
in the intermediary-entrepreneur part of the contract have a very small effect
on investors' payoffs because of Corollary 1. Consequently minimizing the
expected costs of monitoring the entrepreneurs is the main concern).
Theorem 3. If there are sufficiently many entrepreneurs then the optimal
contracts are two-sided simple debt contracts. Two-sided simple debt con-
tracts strictly dominate all other types of contracts.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Assume without loss of generality,
that there exists some alternative two-sided contract (A/(-), /!}(•)), for every
/. which improves upon the optimal two-sided simple debt contract of The-
orem 2. By Theorem 2, we can restrict our analysis to two-sided contracts.
We show:
(i) The investor's part of contract A}(-) must be a simple debt contract, A'j.
Next we choose a two-sided simple debt contract (Rf, R*j) such that entre-
preneurs have the same expected return and the expected payments from the
intermediary to the investors remain constant. 1 ' Furthermore, from Lemma 3
in Section 5. A) > R"j. 18 The contracts (R[, R]) must fulfill the conditions of
Corollary 1 for all sufficiently large / (i.e., there exists R > and z < EG ! {R)
such that R] < z < EG^R) < Ri for all sufficiently large I). 19 We show:
^First choose Rj such that EG! {Ri) = £'G / (.4/()). Because of the continuity results
of Lemma 1. a SDC, R], can be chosen such that / R'I {w)dF{R{)) = f A'I {w)dF{A{)).
18This holds since by Lemma 3, f A'j(w) dF(R{)) > J A}(w)dF{A(-)). Thus, to get
equality we must choose R] < A).
1 By the (indirect) assumption of the proof, (Aj(-),A mj(-)) dominates the optimal two-
sided SDCs of Theorem 2. This is only possible if the probability that investors must mon-
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(ii) Using (R^R}) instead of (A/(-), AJ), the left hand side of (3) decreases
by at most c*
I
e~
aI \AI — Ri\. 20 The left hand side of (4) increases by at
least Icm\Aj— R[\, where m = minx€
[
,T] f(x ),
21 because with simple debt
contracts the intermediary must monitor entrepreneurs in fewer states of
nature. This is essentially the two-sided analogue of Theorem 1.
(iii) Since for large / the surplus is much greater than the loss, we can show
that it is possible to distribute some of the intermediary's gain to the
investors by increasing the face value of R} such that both constraints are
satisfied and not binding. Hence, the face value of Rj can be lowered such
that both constraints still hold. The entrepreneurs are better off with a
contract with a lower face value. Consequently, the two-sided simple debt
contract (Rj, R]) dominates (/!/(•), A\), which provides the contradiction.
Therefore all optimal contracts must be simple debt contracts.
We now prove claim (i). This follows immediately from Theorem 1 be-
cause the intermediary is like an entrepreneur whose production is described
by the random variable G ! (-).
Next we prove claim (ii). In order to compute the change of the left hand
side of (3) we need only compute the change in expected monitoring costs
(because the first integral on the left-hand side of (3) does not change by
construction of (R, R*)). In the following, let Aj be the simple debt contract
itor the intermediary goes to zero as / gets large. Otherwise the expected monitoring costs
would go to infinity. Thus, in the limit investors receive the face value A*j with certainty,
i.e., lim/^oo f A'j(w) dF(A()) = lim/_ 00 A'j. Clearly, the costs of monitoring an individ-
ual entrepreneur Js cdF(w) remain bounded away from zero as / —* oo. Dividing both
sides of (4) by / and taking the limit we conclude that lim/_ 00 A*t < lim/^oo EG I (A( •)),
so there exist z,z' such that A] < z < z' < EG I (A()) for all sufficiently large /. Since
R) < A) by Lemma 3 (c.f., previous footnote) and EG 1'(Ri(-)) = EG^Aji)) by defini-
tion, it follows that ft} < z < z' < EG I {R I {)). Now choose R such that z < R < Rj for
all sufficiently large /. This is exactly the condition of Corollary 1.
20The two-sided SDC does not necessarily minimize the probability of default by the
intermediary. Thus the left hand side of (3) may be smaller under contract (Ai(-),A*f).
21m > by assumption (A2).
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with the same face value as Ai(-). Observe that:
/ cldFiRri-f c}dF(M-))< I $dF(Ri)-'[. %dF{Ai). (8)
Jsk
}
J% Jsh Jsh
This inequality follows from two factors: First, the income of the intermedi-
ary from contract Aj is higher than from contract Aj(-) in all states, hence
less monitoring occurs; and second A} > R}.
Clearly, the difference in payoff from an individual entrepreneur to the
intermediary between the two SDCs with face values Aj and Rj is at most
A l - £,. 22 Therefore
G\Ri) = ji^Gii&t) > ji2lGi(Ai)-(At-Ri)] = G I(A)-(AI-R I ). (9)
Hence (9) implies,
P{G* 7 (A/) < %} > P{G'(Ri) < R] - (A/ - Ri)}. (10)
From (8), (10) and Corollary 1 it now follows that
/ c'jdFiRj)- I c^F(A / (-))<cJe- a/(A / - JR / ). (11)
Js* Js*,.
The intermediary's loss (i.e., the decrease of the left hand side of (4))
can be computed using the main idea of Theorem 1: If agents use contract
A[(-) instead of Ri, the intermediary must monitor in additional states w 6
[Ri,Aj). Hence, expected monitoring costs increase by f^ 1 cdF > cm(.4; —
jR/), and the total loss is at least Icm\Aj — Rj\. This proves (ii).
Finally we prove (iii). Let e > 0. From footnote 19 we have R"j < z <
EG^R) < R[. Hence, by the law of large numbers there exist h > and /
such that
P({G ;(^ 7 ) > R'j + h}) > 1 - £, for all I > I. (12)
"A{ — Rj > since both contracts have the same expected return but Ri is a SDC
(hence it has the lowest face value among all contracts with the same expected return).
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(12) and Corollary 1 imply that by increasing the face value of R*j by h < /i,
the payoff to investors (i.e., the left hand side of (3)) increases by at least
j^-rh(l —e) — hc*je~ aI . If / is sufficiently large, this amount is bounded below
by jh(l — 2e). Again because of (12) the intermediary's profit (i.e., the left
hand side of (4)) is decreased by at most Ih(\ — e).
By choosing h = j^~c*Ie~ aI(Ai — Ri) constraint (3) is fulfilled and not
binding (by the computations in the previous paragraph). Given this h,
the profit of the intermediary decreases by at most Ij Yz^c*je~
aI(Aj — Ri).
Comparing this to the total gain, which is Icm, it is clear that an / can be
chosen independently of Ai, such that the gain is greater than the loss. 23 This
means that constraint (4) is not binding as well, which proves the Theorem.
5 Proofs of Mathematical Results
The following notation will be useful in the analysis that follows. Given some
two-sided contract, let Ti(-) denote the aggregate payoff of the J — 1 investors
from the intermediary who interacts with / entrepreneurs, and 7! denote the
expected payoff of a single investor from the intermediary. For the two-sided
SDC with delegated monitoring, {R{-), R), {R*(-), R') these payoffs are:
T I ({R(-),R),(R
m (-),R')) = I R'(w)dF I (R(-),R)(w)- (13)
./o
7/((tf(0, A), (*•().#))= j^ryM-)]- J/ dF\-). (u)
The following Lemma establishes that the above payoff functions are con-
tinuous in the face values R and R" for SDCs. This proves continuity of
constraint (3). We also prove results which are necessary to get continuity of
constraint (4) and of the argument of the two-sided optimization problem.
23Clearly this is the case if jYz^ c ) e aI < cm which holds for all sufficiently large /
and is independent of Aj and Rj
.
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Lemma 1. Let R(w) be one-sided simple debt with face value R. Then
the functions R t—> f R(w) dF(w) and R i—> Jw<RcdF(w) are continuous.
Furthermore, (R,R*) »-> Ti(R,R*) is continuous; and (R,R*) i—>• ~fi(R,R*)
is continuous at every (R,R*) £ M2 , such that R* < R.
Proof. The proof for the first two functions is straightforward. We now
prove continuity of Yj. Note that,
PiiG'iR) > R m }) < P({G*(R + h)> R m }) < P({G ; (#) > R* - h}), (15)
for h > because of (10). Therefore / f{x)dF I{R + h)(x) < f f(x +
h) dF(R)(x), for every increasing step-function /, and hence for every arbi-
trary increasing function / by a standard approximation argument. Further,
|A(-) —
^(Oloo — \A — R\, for all simple debt contracts A and R. Thus,
\TI(R + h,R* + h*)-TI(R,Rm )\ < \h\+ \h*\, (16)
for every h, h" > and hence for every h,h* £ IR. This proves continuity of
Tj. It now remains to prove that (R,R m ) i—* f_ 00 c~ dF(R) is continuous at
every (R, R*) 6 IR such that R" < R. The distribution of G l (R) has a density
which is bounded by a Kn £ IR in (—oo,i?) (c.f. Lemma 4). Therefore (15)
implies
| f*^ c
m dFT(R) - f*^ c' dF\R + h)\ < Kn \h\. Since this inequality
holds for every R" < R and since R" h+ f_ ao c" dF ! (R) is clearly continuous,
this proves continuity of 7/.
To prove optimality of two-sided simple debt we need an additional tech-
nical Lemma which shows that two-sided simple debt contracts maximize
total payments to investors (not including monitoring costs). The result is
formally stated in Lemma 3. It follows immediately from the next Lemma.
Lemma 2. Let f.t be a probability measure on [0,A/]. Let R(-) and A(-) be
two contracts with the same expected value. We assume that R(-) is a simple
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debt contract R. Then the simple debt contract is less risky than A(-) in the
sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz; i.e., f u(A(w)) dfi(w) < f u(R(w)) dfi(w),
for all concave functions u.
If we interpret u as a utility function, then Lemma 2 essentially says that
all risk averse consumers prefer the simple debt contract to any other contract
with the same expected value. This is one of the criteria for comparing the
riskiness of two distribution of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). By using
Theorem 2 of their paper which proves the equivalence of three different
concepts, and by using their argument on p. 230 ff, the proof of the Lemma
is straightforward. The idea to use the Rothschild and Stiglitz criterion for
the proof of Lemma 3 is due to Martin Hellwig. We now give the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let Ha and Hr be the cumulative density functions
of the distributions of A(-) and R{-), respectively. Let G(t) = H^t) — Hpt(t),
and let T(y) = / y G(x) dx. Then A(-) is more risky than R(-) if the following
two conditions are fulfilled:
(17) T(M) = 0, and (18) T(y) > for every y e [0, M}.
Let g be the density of G. Partial integration yields T(M) = /A/ G(x) dx =
xG(x)\q I — Jq xg(x)dx = 0, since the integral over xg(x) is just the expected
value of A(-) — R(-). This proves (17). Now note that G(t) > for every
< t < R, and that G(t) < for every R < t < M. This together with (17)
proves (18). Theorem 2 of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) implies that A(-)
is more risky than R{-). This proves the Lemma.
Lemma 3. Let (R, R") be a two-sided simple debt contract and (A(-),R m )
be an alternative contract where EG I (A(-)) = EG ! (R). Then r[(R,R") >
ri(A('),tir).
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Proof. Note that
r,(£(.). &()) = JJ-"J R^jE R(wi)) dF(wl )dF(w2 ) . . . dF(Wl ). (19)
Since R*(-) is a concave function we can apply Lemma 2 and inductively
substitute R(-) by A(-) in (19). This proves the Lemma.
Next we show that convergence in the law of large number is exponential.
This result is used in Section 3 to establish gains from delegated monitoring.
The proof follows immediately from the large deviation principle.
Lemma 4. Let (X,-),-e jv be a sequence of independent identically distributed
random variables with values in [0, M] and distribution \l. Let \xn be the
distribution of ~Y =^ \ X{. Then /^ n ([0, b\) converges to zero exponentially as
n —> oo for every b < EX{.
Proof. M(£) = f e^x df.i(x) < oo for every £ E JR, since f.i has a compact
support. Let X(x) — supe
€
jj(£x— log M(£)). Then Cramers theorem (Stroock
p. 30 ff.) implies that X is a "rate function", and that fi n satisfies the large
deviation principle with rate X . Consequently
limsupl/nlog/£n ([0,6]) < - inf J(x), (20)
n£N x€[0,6]
for every 6
€
IR. We now prove that infx6
[ ,6]
X(x) > for every 6 < EX t :
X(x) is decreasing on { —oo,EXx \ (Stroock Lemma (3.3)). Therefore we
need only prove that X(b) > for every b < EX
t
. For fixed b let H(£) =
£b- logM(£). Since H(0) = 0, it is sufficient to show that H'{0) ^ 0. This,
however, can be easily verified:
H'(f) b f
xe^f( x ) dx
Uj
Jet* f{x) dx
consequently H'(0) = b - EX, ^ 0. This and (20) imply that for every b <
EX
t
there exists an a > and an integer n such that \/n log /i n ([0, b]) < —a
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for every n > n. Consequently
M[0, b]) < e~an ^ every n>n. (21)
For the optimality of two-sided simple debt contracts proved in Section 4
we need a stronger result than Lemma 4. In particular, we must show that
the densities of fin also converge to zero exponentially on every interval [0, 6]
where b < EX{.
Lemma 5. Let (Xt )j 6 /v be a sequence of independent, identically distributed
random variables with values in [0, M] and distribution /i. We assume that
H = jj, + \8r where supp ji C [0, R] and \i has a density f with respect to the
Lebesgue measure on JR. We assume that f is continuously differentiable on
[0, M\. Let ft n be the distribution of - Y%=i Xis and ^ $R be the Dirac point
measure. Then fi n = jln -\- \ n 8R where supp/in C [0, R]. ji. n has a density
fn with respect to the Lebesgue measure which converges uniformly to zero as
n —* oo on all compact subsets of[0,EX t ). This convergence is exponential.
The idea of the proof of Lemma 5 is as follows. We first show that
the derivative of the density functions of G ! (R(-)) is bounded by a poly-
nomial term (24). This is straighforward if the densities are continuously
differentiable with compact support in IR, see for example Floret (1981) Ex-
ercise 14.24. In our case the densities are discontinuous at and R which
requires us to deal with the derivatives at these two points separately. The
idea of the proof, however, is essentially the same. If the Lemma does not
hold then this immediately implies that the measure of an interval [0, b] can
only converge to zero with polynomial speed (25). However, by Lemma 4 the
probability of every such interval with b < G l [R{-)) converges to zero with
exponential speed as / —> oo (21). This contradiction proves Lemma 5.
Proof: We first derive an upper boundary for the derivative of fn . The main
problem is that / is discontinous at and R as a function defined on IR.
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Claim 1: Let it, v be functions on IR with support in [0,T]. Let u be
continuous from the right and bounded. Let v be continuously differentiate
in [0,T]. Then the convolution u * v is continuous from the right and |(it *
u)'I < IMLbll +2|«| ||u| .
Let z(t,x,h) = u(t)±[v(x+ h-t)-v(x-t)]. Furthermore let Blfh = {t: -h <
x - t < 0} and let B2
,
h = {t:T - h < t - x < T}. Then
/ z(t,x,h)dt = h z(x + th,x,h)dt = / u(x + th)v(h — th) dt.
JBlh Jo Jo
Consequently lim^ois z(t,x,h)dt = u(x)u(0), since u and v are differen-
tiable from the right. A similar argument yields lim^o fB2 h z(t,x,h) dt =
u(x)v(T). Therefore
{u * v)'(x) = lim [ z{t,x,h)dt = I' u(t)v'(x - t) dt + u(x)v(0) + u(x)v(T),
h[0 J J
which proves claim 1.
Claim 2: The distribution of ££=1 X{ has a density gn on [0,nR). The
point {nR} has probability A n . The right-hand derivative g'n (x) exists for
every n E W and for every x € [0, rci?). Further, there exists a constant
^ <
-ll/'loo + ^I/ll
2
suc^ ^at ItfuWI ^ n2K f° r everY n € W and for every
x <G [0,ni2).
For the proof of claim 2 we proceed by induction. For n = 1 there is nothing
to prove. We now assume that the inequality holds for n — .1. Using the
formula for the density of the sum of two independent random variables and
accounting for the "point mass"1 A at R and A n_1 at (n — \)R we get
9n(x) = Jgn-i(t)f(x -t)dt + X
n~ lf(x - (n - l)R) + Xgn^(x - H), (22)
for every x £ [0,ni?]. (22) implies
l^nlL < bn-l|J/L + |/L + bn-lL < 21/^ + WOn-ll^-
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Consequently
lfl»L < 2n|/|„„. ' (23)
Using (22), (23) and claim 1 yields
\S»L $ ISn-iU/'l. + 4n|/£ + A-M/'L + Wn-iL-
By substituting the induction hypothesis for K = 2||/ / | oo +4|/|| 2 , we conclude
the proof of claim 2.
Note that fn (x) = ngn (nx) is the density of jl n with respect to the
Lebesgue measure. We get
|/n( x )l < n
4K, for every n £ iV, and for every x E [0,R). (24)
In the second part of the proof we proceed indirectly. Assume that there
exists a 6 < EX
t
such that fn does not converge uniformly to zero on [0, 6]
with exponential speed. That means that there exist a sequence en that does
not converge exponentially to zero and a sequence (yn ) n^pj in [0, b] such that
fn{Vn) > £ f°r every n E IN. We prove that under these circumstances, (24)
implies that // n ([0,6]) cannot converge to zero exponentially which contra-
dicts Lemma 4.
Let
l / \ (
e-n 4K{x -yn ), if yn < x < yn + -^;
hn (x) = <
.
{ 0, otherwise.
Let b' 6 [b,EX x ). Then there exists an integer n such that yn + -frr < b'
for every n > n. Consequently < h n (x) < fn {x) for every n > rc, because
of (24). Therefore
/*n([0,6']) = /
6
fn (x)dx > I* h n (x)dx = -i—
.
(25)
Jo Jo 2n 4A
By (21) and (25) we get ^477 < e~
an for every n > max(n, n), a contradiction.
This proves the Lemma.
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We are now ready to prove Corollary 1 from Section 4.
Proof of Corollary 1. The distribution of 0, has by assumption a density
/ which is continuously different iable on [0, M]. The densities of F 1 (R) are
then given by Jr — /|[o,ffl + <$r, so the constant K of (24) can be chosen
independently of R. Thus inequality (25) holds uniformly for every R. Fur-
ther, P(Gn (R) < x) < P{Gn (R) < x) for every x e M. Thus, (21) holds
uniformly for every distribution \i n of Gn (R), where R > R, so Lemma 5 also
holds uniformly for every R > R. This proves the Corollary.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we extend the Gale and Hellwig (1985) contract problem to
the delegated monitoring setting proposed by Diamond (1984). As in Dia-
mond, a crucial problem in the analysis is to ensure that the monitor reports
truthfully to investors. We use a two-sided version of Townsend's (1979)
fixed cost, deterministic state verification technology to solve the monitor's
incentive problem. We show that delegated monitoring dominates direct
investment and that two-sided simple debt is optimal. Our economic envi-
ronment requires us to introduce new mathematical arguments based on the
large deviation principle. This mathematical technique is essential in our
model because when the cost of monitoring the monitor depends on its size,
the law of large numbers is not sufficient to establish gains from interme-
diation. In addition, even if monitoring costs are independent of size, the
large deviation argument is necessary to derive the optimality of simple debt
(since uniform convergence of the densities does not follow from the law of
large numbers).
We obtain our results in an economy where the intermediary has no in-
herent information, risk, or cost advantage, and where monitoring is deter-
ministic. Recently, costly state verification studies (c.f., Townsend (1988)
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and Mookherjee and Png (1989)) have shown that the form of the optimal
contract may be altered under stochastic monitoring. In contrast, our dele-
gated monitoring result is not affected by stochastic monitoring. This follows
from the fact that as in the deterministic case, the probability that a state
occurs in the stochastic case which triggers monitoring goes to zero expo-
nentially. Hence the expected cost of monitoring the monitor goes to zero
as well, and delegated monitoring continues to dominate direct investment.
Our rationale for studying deterministic monitoring is similar to that given
for the cost symmetry assumption in Section 2. We wish to establish gains
from delegated monitoring which stem solely from the intermediary's ability
to eliminate duplicative verification costs for a benchmark case. If other fac-
tors exist which further reduce monitoring costs (e.g., stochastic monitoring),
intermediation will be even more attractive.
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